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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
La VELL KEMP and THELMA 
ALICE KEMP, his wife, 
Third Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 





The Third Party Plaintiffs, La V ell Kemp and 
Thelma Alice Kemp will be referred to hereinafter as 
Appellants and the Defendant, Zions First National 
Rank, will be referred to as Respondent. All italics are 
added for emphasis. 
1 
S'I,'ATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to determine the priority of two 
separate mortgage liens effecting certain parcels of real 
property situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury. 
At the conclusion of trial, special interrogatories were 
propounded to the jury, and the Court thereupon ent-
ered judgment on the verdict in favor of the Respondent 
and against the Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks affirmance of the Trial-Courts 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Sometime between September and the early part of 
November, 1964, Dr. Joseph W. Noble contacted the 
Appellants for the purpose of purchasing their interest 
and title in two separate parcels of real property lo-
cated in the vicinity of Draper, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah (R. 63-65). After some negotiations Appel-
lan'ts agreed to sell the said properties, and on the 19th 
day of November, 1964, executed and delivered a War· 
2 
nu1ty Deed, without restrictions, to the said Joseph W. 
and Eilene S. Noble, his wife, as joint tenants, 
rdativc to the subject property (Ex. 9-P) (R. 71 ) . 
At the time said Warranty Deed was executed, Appel-
lants knew that Grantees in said Deed were in the pro-
cess of obtaining mortgage financing from the Respond-
ent with which to obtain funds to purchase the subject 
properties, and that the said Respondent contemplated 
a mortgage loan upon said properties as security for 
said loan (R. 175, 176, 177). On November 20, 1964, 
the N ables executed and delivered a Deed of Trust in 
favor of the Respondent, covering the subject proper-
ties, to secure the repayment of a loan in the amount of 
$35,000.00, evidenced by a Promissory Note of even 
date (Ex. 19-D, and 20-D) (R. 145, 146, 147, 148). On 
November 21, 1964, the Appellants called at the office 
of the Respondent, reviewed a Closing Statement (Ex. 
10-D) and affixed their respective signatures to said 
statement in approval thereof, and thereafter obtained 
the balance of the monies reflected as due the Seller (R. 
fll, 92, 164). 
In late November 1964, Appellants received in the 
mail a Promissory Note in the principal sum of 
$29,000.00 dated November 30, 1964, and a mortgage 
dated November 20, 1964, bearing the signatures of the 
said Joseph W. Noble and Eilene S. Noble (Ex. 7-P 
and 8-P) ( R. 66) . When Appellants received the note 
and mortgage they "just put them away" (R. 67) and 
failed to record the said mortgage until February 9, 
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1966, more than fourteen months following the date of 
receipt of said instruments. 
It was not until after the Nobles had defaulted in 
the mortgage indebtedness in favor of the Respondent 
that the Kemps called the bank and advised them that 
they held a "second mortgage" on the property and 
wanted to know what they should do because they und-
erstoood that the bank was foreclosing or threatening 
foreclosure of its mortgage lien (R. 153). At no time 
prior thereto had the Appellants or any other party ever 
given the Respondent notice of any claim or asserted 
interest of the Appellants nor the fact that any addition-
al sum remained unpaid upon the purchase price of the 
properties. (R. 153). 
The Respondent, to facilitate the closing of its 
mortgage loan with the Nobles, obtained a Preliminary 
Title Report from Security Title Company of Salt 
Lake City, Utah (Ex. 16-P ) and utilized said report 
in the closing of said loan to obtain Deeds of Convey· 
ance and other appropriate document!) as evidence of a 
clear, marketable title in the Nobles (R. 145 ) . Instruc· 
tions for the preparation of the closing statements were 
given by the Borrower, Dr. Noble, and all statements 
of account were made pursuant to the instructions of 
the Borrower and in conformance with the aforesaid 
Preliminary Title Report. It was not until after the 
Respondent had instituted proceedings to foreclose its 
Deed of Trust that the Appellants came forward and 
asserted their claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
There can be no argument as to the rules of law 
applicable in the instant case. Neither can there be any 
<loubt as to the identity of the rules which are determin-
ative of the issues. The Purchase Money Mortgage, 
considered to be a creature of equity and to be accorded 
priority, must meet certain standards and requirements. 
In general, a Purchase Money Mortgage has been de-
fined as: 
"A mortgage given concurrently with a convey-
ance of land, by the vendor to the vendee, on the 
same land, to secure the unpaid balance of the 
purchase price." See 6 A.L.R. 1420, Ladd & 
Tilton Bank v. Mitchell, 93 Oreg. 668, 184 P. 
282, 284. 
To avoid confusion in dealing with real property, 
the State of Utah has enacted a statute intended to put 
at rest the issue of priorities of liens and interests in real 
property. Title 57, Chapter 1, Section 6 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, is the controlling statute on this 
point. It is therein stated: 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing setting forth an agree• 
ment to convey any real estate or whereby any 
real estate may be affected, to operate as notice 
to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged 
and certified in the manner prescribed by this 
title and recorded in the office of the Recorder 
of the County in which said real estate is situ-. 
ated, but shall be valid and binding between the 
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledg-
5 
merits, certification, or recording, and as to all 
other persons who have had actual notice. * * • 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is in 45 Am.Jr., Section 172, RECORDS 
and RECORDING LAWS, that: 
"The intention of the acts requiring deeds to 
be recorded is to secure subsequent purchasers 
and encumbrancers against prior secret convey· 
ances and fradulent encumbrances; and there· 
fore, when a person has notice of a prior conven-
ance it is not a secret conveyance by which he can 
be prejudiced. It is an elementary rule in the 
construction of recording laws that notice of an 
unrecorded instrument is equivalent to the re-
cording of it, with respect to the person having 
such notice. As a general rule, an unrecorded 
deed or other instrument affecting the title to 
land is valid, therefore, against a subsequent pur· 
chaser taking with knowledge or notice of the 
existence of the instrument; and while this ex· 
ception is usually the result of construction, yet it 
is sometimes expressly declared by the statute." 
From the foregoing, it is evident that where a re· 
cording statute has been enacted, that the same governs 
in the case of parties who deal with property without 
act;ual notice of any outstanding or conflicting interest. 
A landmark case in point involving issues of the 
instant case is that of John Jackson v. W. E. Reid, 30 
Kans. 10, 1 P. 308. The identical issue as to which of 
two mortgages was entitled to priority was raised in that 
case. The court there stated that under the circum· 
stances, where the party who had recorded the first and 
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prior mortgage without actual notice of the alleged pur-
diase money mortgage was entitled to priority. The 
court there stated: 
"In such a case the burden is on the holder of 
the prior unrecorded mortgage to prove the ex-
ceptions named in the section. Prima facie, it is 
subordinate to the latter recorded mortgage. So 
it developed upon Jackson to show that Turner 
had actual notice. * * * So far as the registry 
laws affect the question, a mortgage stands upon 
the same platform as a deed. * * * The unre-
corded instrument, whether deed or mortgage, is 
void except as between the parties, and those who 
have actual notice, and a party ignorant of an un-
recorded instrument may purchase of one holding 
recorded title or mortgage of interest without 
fear of being disturbed by the claimant of such 
unrecorded instrument. Mott v. Clark, 9 Pa. 
State 399, Wade Notice, Section 262; Choteau v. 
Jones, 11 Ill. 300; Lightner v. Mooney, 10 
'Vatts, 407. * * * But the fact that a .r_nortgage 
is given for purchase money, does not place it 
outside the provisions of the Registry Act or give 
it priority to which it would not be entitled under 
said Act." 
From the foregoing authority it is of interest to 
note that the Utah statute on recording appears to con-
tain the same identical language as the Kansas statute. 
It is further stated in 59 C.J.S., Section 245, on 
JIORTGAGES: 
"In the absence of a statute or special circum-
stances taking the case out of the general rule, 
and in the absence of special equities growing out 
of questions of notice, good or bad faith, want 
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of consideration, or the like, the rule of priority 
as between two independent mortgages on the 
same property at different times to different 
mortgages, is that the one first recorded is a 
superior lien to the other, whether it was execut. 
ed before or after such other. * * * 
Of further interest on the issue of purchase money 
.Mortgages is the language contained in 59 C.J.S., Sec-
tion 246 ( b), wherein it is stated: 
"* * * the fact that an unrecorded mortgage 
is for the purchase money of land will not neces-
sarily give it priority over a later mortgage re· 
corded before the purchase money mortgage; il 
the holder o fthe purchase money mortgage vol-
untarily withholds it from record and meanwhile 
money is lent on another mortgage which is re· 
corded with due diligence, the usual rule will ap-
ply and give priority to the mortgage first re-
corded, and a purchase money mortgage may be 
subordinated to valid intervening liens acquired 
without notice that the mortgage was for pur-
chase money for the latter, although recorded, 
does not recite that it is such a mortgage. A pur· 
chase money mortgage is not prior to a previous· 
ly recorded mortgage of which the holder of the 
purchase money mortgage had both constructive 
and actual notice. There is also authority to the 
effect that a purchase money mortgage is not en-
titled to priority over a second mortgage which is 
filed first, although the second mortga&'ee has 
notice of the purchase money mortgage. ' 
It is of interest to note that from the testimony ad· 
duced in the trial of the instant case, the Kemps did in 
fact have actual notice of the existence of the mortgage 
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in favor of Zion's First National Bank, and if not actual 
notice, they were charged with constructive notice. Un-
questionably, the Kemps voluntarily withheld their 
mortgage from the public record; and under the rules 
announced in the foregoing authorities there can be no 
doubt but what the mortgage lien of Zion's First Na-
tional Bank is entitled to a priority over the mortgage 
lien of the Kemps. 
Another case in point is that of Farmers Merch-
ants State Bank of Cawker City v. Higgins, et al., 149 
Kans. 783, 89 P. 2d 916. In that case the landowner 
gave a deed of the subject property to his daughter and 
thereafter gave the bank, for valuable consideration, a 
mortgage covering the same land without the bank hav-
ing actual notice of the prior deed. The mortgage was 
filed of record prior to the deed, and the court there su-
stained the mortgage as having priority under the re-
cording statutes of the State of Kansas, which statute 
is essentially identical with the statute of the State of 
Utah. The court there stated: 
"The plaintiff being a purchaser for value 
without notice the statute gives the mortgage of 
plaintiff priority of the deed of defendant." 
As further authority on the issue, I invite the 
court's attention to 105 A.L.R. at page 889, where, in 
discussing the issue of priorities of equitable title against 
otherwise prior liens of mortgages, it is stated: 
"Appellees assert an equitable title against the 
otherwise prior liens of the mortgagees. They 
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thus assumed the burden of showing that the 
mortgagees had knowledge of their rights at the 
time they took their mortgages, or that, through 
appellee's possession, appellants had means of 
knowledge which they ignored. * * * There is 
a finding that appellants had no actual knowl-
edge of the rights or possession of appellees. 
There is no finding that the mortgagees were not 
good faith holders, without notice and no facts 
are found which are sufficient as a matter of law 
to impute knowledge to appellants and there-
fore appellees did not sustain the burden which 
was upon them. Under all the facts specially 
found, the mortgagees must be treated as having 
taken their mortgage liens in good faith and 
without notice of appellee' s equities." 
36 Am.Jur. at Section 209 of .MORTGAGES 
states: 
"It is a general rule in equity that where a 
person having rights, and knowing these rights, 
sees another person taking a mortgage upon 
property, without disclosing his title, he shall not 
be allowed afterward to set up his title to def eat 
the mortgage. A fortiori, a strong case of estop-
pel is made out when, by conduct or representa-
tion, an owner encourages another to believe that 
a third person is the owner of land and thereby 
induces the other to take a mortgage on the prop· 
erty. Similarly, a mortgagee may lose priority 
because of circumstances which constitute a 
waiver, or which estop him from asserting such 
priority. This is particularly true where there 
is fraud or negligence on the part of the mort· 
gagee. Such estoppel may result where the P.arty 





by a specific statement of the party alleged to be 
estopped." 
Section 210: 
"While there are cases in which silence alone is 
held not to affect the rights of a mortgagee, as 
a general rule a mortgagee who stands by and 
sees another lending money on the same estate 
without giving him notice of his prior mortgage 
will be held to be estopped from asserting his 
encumbrance as a prior lien against the party 
whom he permitted to make the advance of fur-
ther loan. In such cases it is declared to be in-
equitable to allow the mortgagee to profit by his 
own wrong in concealing his claim, thereby lend-
ing encouragement to the new loan. The conclu-
sion that the holder of a first mortgage shall be 
disbarred from asserting his priority is partic-
ularly applicable where he was affected with 
notice that the person who accepted the later 
mortgage would not have advanced the loan ex-
cept upon the terms that such loan should con-
stitute a paramount charge upon the property in 
question." 
A review of the testimony and evidence in the in-
stant case conclusively demonstrates that the Kemps 
by their silence and their conduct have waived any 
priority of mortgage lien which they now assert; and 
furthermore, that under the rules of equity they should 
not now be permitted to reap the advantages and bene-
fits of a first mortgage lien in the light of their conduct 
of standing idly by and permitting the bank to advance 
its moneys upon the subject property without disclosing 
to the bank that they claimed an interest paramount to 
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that of the bank, or any interest at all. The doctrines of Jc 
estoppel and waiver seem abundantly available as de. N 
fenses to the claims of the said Kemps. D 
A landmark case in the State of Utah involving the to 
identical issue of purchase money mortgage as asserted gi 
in the instant case, is that of State v. Johnson, 71 Utah 
572, 268 P. 561. In that case the issue involved was a st 
determination of priority of two mortgages upon the 
same tract of land. The court there discussing the matter 
of purchase money mortgages states: 
"A mortgage for purchase money, to be en. 
titled to preference, must be executed simultane· 
ously with the deed of conveyance from the ven· 
dor. If an interval of time is left between the 
two transactions, then preference is lost." There 
citing l Jones on MORTGAGES, Section 583. 
(Emphasis added) . 
The court further noted that in that case, where the 
moneys from the first mortgage had been utilized to pay 
the vendor, that such a mortgage was as much a pur· 
chase money mortgage as the other, and that the equities 
of the two mortgages were equal. In the light of the 
facts of the instant case, where the deed of conveyance 
from the Kemps to the N ables was dated, executed, and 
delivered on the 19th day of November, 1964, and the 
date of the obligation representing the vendor's lien was 
November 30, 1964, the mortgage securing the same 
dated November 20, 1964, delivered in late November, 
1964, and not recorded until February 9, 1966, there 
can be no doubt but that under the rule of law in the 
12 
if Johnson case aforesaid, the mortgage lien of Zion's First 
e- National Bank dated November 20, 1964, and recorded 
December 4, 1964 would, as a matter of law, be entitled 
to and should be accorded priority over the Kemp mort-
1e 
,d gage. 









"The reason most frequently advanced for the 
rule giving preference to purchase money mort-
gage of outstanding interests acquired through 
the mortgagor is that the execution of the deed 
and mortageg are simultaneous acts so that no 
claim or lien arising through the mortgagor can 
attach before the purchase money mortageg. * * * 
(Emphasis added) (See 117 Kan. 717; 232 P . 
1060) 
A further statement of the law relevant to the issue 
e involved in the instant case is in Ogden's California Real 
Property Law, page 650, Section 17.32, wherein it is 
there stated: 
"A mortgage given by the purchaser to secure 
a portion of the purchase price of the property 
covered thereby takes a special priority, i.e., it 
is superior to all other liens created against the 
purchaser, sub.feet to the operation of the record-
ing laws.* * * (Tolman v. Smith, 85 Cal. 280). 
In the case of Rogers v. Tucker as cited in 137 
A.L.R. at page 572, the purchase money mortgage was 
e accorded priority where the second mortgage to a third 
e person was recorde d prior to the purchase money mort-
13 
gage by the second mortgagee who had knowledge of 
the existence of the unrecorded mortgage. 
Of simliar significance is the case of Corning v. 
Murray, 3 N.Y. 652, wherein it was stated: 
"Where parties had know ledge of all the cir-
cumstances, subsequently recorded purchase 
money mortgage had priority as between parties, 
but a transferee of the mortgage which was first 
recorded having no notice of existing equities in 
favor of the purchase money mortgage, had a· 
right to rely upon the record." 
It is interesting to note from all of the foregoing 
authorities that in order for the purchase money mort-
gage to be entitled to priority, the deed of conveyance 
and the purchase money mortgage must be executed 
simultaneously. There must be actual not.ice of the exist· 
ence of the purchase money lien and the purchase money 
mortgage must not be withheld from the public record · 
in such manner as to mislead other parties dealing with 
the subject property. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, an analysis of the evidence and testi-
mony in this case clearly preponderates in favor of the 
conclusion that the mortgage of Zion's First National 
Bank is a first and prior lien, and that the mortgage 
lien of the Kemps is and should be decreed to constitute 
a junior and subordinate mortgage against the subject 
properties. 
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if When we consider that the jury in the instant case, 
sitting in an advisory capacity to the court, found from 
a preponderance of the evidence that the Zion's First V, 
National Bank did not have actual notice of the exist-
ence of the Kemp mortgage at any time prior to the 
r- recorda ti on of the Bank's lien; and the further admitted 
;e fact that the Kemps negligently omitted to disclose 
S, 
st their position with reference to the subject property un-
m til February of 1966; that the said Kemps accepted the 
a benefits of the mortgage proceeds obtained from the 
said Zion's First National Bank; and that the mortgage 
1g in favor of the said Bank was with due diligence made a 
t- matter of public record, and the funds advanced thereon, 
:e there can be put one conclusion under the prevailing 
!d rules of law as hereinabove announced; and that is, that 
t· the mortgage lien of Zion's First National Bank is en-
!)' titled to preference and priority to the mortgage lien of 









BRANT H. WALL 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent, 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
15 
